Caliornia's Voting Machine Review Shows Iowa Needs Needs to Do More to Protect the Vote
By Sean Flaherty, IVI
Dear Iowa Voters,
This
month California completed a top-to-bottom review of its voting
systems, and concluded that the same Diebold touchscreen voting
machines used in 71 Iowa counties are not secure enough to use as a
primary voting system. The review also calls Diebold's suite of
election systems “an oceanliner built without watertight doors.” Click
here to read more about the review's findings.
California Secretary of State Debra Bowen has decided to severely restrict the use of touchscreens.
Bowen's
decision reminds us that Iowans need to finish what we started, and
replace touchscreen voting machines with voter-marked paper ballots.
17 Iowa
counties use Diebold touchscreens as the only system at the polling
place, and another 54 use both Diebold's touchscreens and their paper
ballot scanners.
Contact
Governor Culver, and let him know that Iowa should fund the purchase of
paper ballot systems, with optical scanners and ballot-marking devices
to serve voters with disabilities. A sample letter is at
the end of this alert.
Governor
Culver signed our new paper ballot law last May, which transitions the
state gradually to optical scan and ballot-marking devices. Counties
can use touchscreens until they wear out, or until they decide to
replace their voting system. Florida is making a faster switch to paper
ballots, with Maryland and Virginia following. 17 states already use
only voter-marked paper ballots in their elections.
Only $2
million was allocated for Iowa counties to buy new systems, though, and
a full conversion to paper ballots and optical scan could cost up to
$10 million. Let the Governor know that the state should finish
the job, and make the necessary funds available to counties to replace
touchscreens. Click here for more talking points on paper-ballot vs.
touchscreen systems.
Background on the Diebold Report
“We are
not optimistic that stricter chain-of-custody controls will prove
effective in addressing the vulnerabilities identified in this report.”1
The
above is a quote from California's expert team that studied the
computer code of the same Diebold voting systems used in 71 Iowa
counties. The review team, led by David Wagner of the University of
California-Berkeley, also compares the systems to an oceanliner built
without watertight doors.2 Election results can be corrupted on
this equipment.
All
Diebold equipment, including its ballot scanner, has grave problems.
But at least with paper ballots, we have a clear record of the voter's
intent.
The
touchscreen's voter-verifiable paper trail is likely to go unchecked
too often, while paper ballots are inherently voter-verified. Diebold's
touchscreen stores votes electronically with a timestamp, threatening
ballot secrecy. Its security is also worse than that of the Diebold
ballot scanner, allowing corruption that would “be very difficult to
disinfect with confidence” (page 22 of the source code review).
California
is also planning a similar review of Iowa's only other voting system
vendor, Election Systems and Software (ES&S). ES&S did not
provide its code or equipment in time for this review, though the
security of its iVotronic touchscreen (the voting machine that made
Sarasota, Florida the election meltdown of 2006) has been severely
criticized by computer scientists.
Testing
that is done before an election offers little defense against software
manipulation; well-designed malicious code can avoid testing
conditions, by running only when a certain number of ballots have been
run, by running only when the machine has been in use for a period
longer than a typical test, and other conditions (page 58 of the source
code review, and pages 43-44 of the 2006 Brennan Center report).
Another
often-heard argument, that election officials can guard against
tampering with a strict chain of custody, simply does not hold
up. Iowa has great election officials, but the weaknesses of
these machines require absolute trust in all who have access to them.
We should trust the process, not individuals.
And as
the Carter-Baker Commission noted in 2005, even perfect security in an
election office does not guard against tampering by insiders of a
voting machine company. Insider fraud has, of course, occurred in
other industries, including the financial services industry. The
Carter-Baker Commission wrote:
There
is no reason to trust insiders in the election industry more than in
other industries, such as gambling, where sophisticated insider fraud
has occurred despite extraordinary measures to prevent it.
There is
a lot for Iowans to take from the California report, and from Secretary
of State Bowen's decisions. She is also developing new standards for
post-election hand counts to verify electronic tallies. Hand-count
audits are as essential as any measure to protect the vote, and Iowa
does not do them yet. That will be our next big step.
Educating
your county Auditor about the Diebold report is another great step to
take – if you live in a county that uses Diebold. Click here to
see if your county uses Diebold, and find your county Auditor's contact
information here. The two points to drive home: chain of custody
cannot be made secure enough with these systems, and pre-election
testing does not do much do much to detect software manipulation.
But
first things first: we need funding to replace direct-recording
electronic touchscreens. A sample letter to the Governor is
below. Your own language is best, so use this as a template.
Click here to view all the California Secretary of State's reports.
There is
more work to do to verify our elections, but we continue to win, step
by step. Help us keep on this winning streak for verified voting.
Thank you for all you do.
Best regards,
Sean Flaherty
Co-Chair, Iowans for Voting Integrity
http://www.IowansForVotingIntegrity.org
1Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System, David Wagner and colleagues, p. 58
2, p. 20
Contact Information for the Governor
Office of The Governor and Lt. Governor
State Capitol
Des Moines, IA 50319
515.281.5211
E-mail form:
Sample Letter
Dear Governor Culver,
Thank
you for signing legislation to move the state toward voter-marked paper
ballots with optical scanners. Iowa joins a number of states,
including Florida, in moving to adopt the voting system that offers the
best record of the voter's intent. Counties need funding to make
this conversion, though. The $2 million budgeted for new equipment this
year is only a start.
The
recent review of voting systems by California's Secretary of State
confirms that the nationwide experiment with touchscreen voting should
come to an end. California is ending the use of Diebold
touchscreens as a primary voting system, due to fundamental and
unacceptable security vulnerabilities
Please
consult with Secretary of State Mauro and the Assembly, and budget the
necessary funds for Iowa to provide all of its voters with voting
systems that preserve the intent of the voters.
Respectfully,
Your Name Here
Blog For Iowa 